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Mining and the Environment:
The Clean Air Issue in New Mexico,
1960-1980
CHRISTOPHER J. HUGGARD

Air pollution was a growing problem in the Southwest after World War
II. Yet, because of the nearly century-long confidence in the smokestack industries in the United States, few citizens complained of the
atmospheric toxins emitted by this economic leviathan. In New Mexico
and other mining states in the West, people traditionally accepted these
tradeoffs. Economic prosperity and jobs took precedence over protection of the environment. From their perspective, mining and other industries had propelled the United States to the top of the world power
structure by 1945, and Cold War policies required a continuation of the
United States industrial revolution that began in the late nineteenth
century. In the post-World War II era, westerners continued to think in
exploitative terms characteristic of an extractive, frontier society.
By the 1960s, however, environmentalists introduced a new awareness of the injustices against the atmosphere and lithosphere of the
Earth. No longer was the West's mineral wealth seen solely in economic
terms. And, with the increasing number of deaths to cancer, humans
began to perceive themselves as vulnerable victims of industry's environmental irresponsibility. National, regional, and local environmental
groups decided to alleviate these problems by protesting the release of
toxins into the air. Congress also reacted by imposing regulations on
industry. Among these remarkable measures was the Clean Air Act of
. 1967, and its amendments in 1970 and 1977. These laws established regulation of industrial and automobile emissions and initiated a national air
pollution debate that trickled down to state and local levels in the Southwest.
Christopher.J. Huggard recently completed a Ph.D. in history at the University of New
Mexico. His dissertation is titled, "Environmental and Economic Change in the Twentieth-Century West: The History of the Copper Industry in New Mexico."
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The environmental movement represented the second major confrontation that industry faced in the twentieth century. The first, of course,
was the rise of labor. Clearly, both movements threatened the traditional
power base of industry. And, just as industry fought to stifle the rise of
labor in the 1930s and 1940s, it also fought to block environmental regulations in the 1960s and 1970s. When Congress announced intentions to
amend the Clean Air Act in 1977, for example, the result was the geatest
flurry of lobbying since the Taft-Hartley Act of1947. Despite industrial
delay tactics concerning labor in the 1940s and the environment in the
1970s, industry was required in the end to change its policies.
In the same year that copper workers of the International Union of
Mine, Mill, & Smelter Workers (Mine-Mill) merged with the United Steel
Workers to form a mega-union for mine laborers, Congress passed the
1967 Clean Air Act, which implemented the first ever federal air pollution
regulations. Industry began to accept its responsibilities to the workers,
agreeing to generous labor contracts that provided higher wages, safer
working conditions, health care, and insurance. Industrialists had no
intention, however, of giving in to environmentalism. From 1967 to 1977,
in fact, industry did everything in its power to delay implementation of
air quality controls.
In many ways, the air pollution battle in New Mexico paralleled the
national fight. The state legislature, for instance, passed the Air Quality
Control Act in 1967, paving the way for regulation of industrial emissions. The climax of New Mexico's air battle occurred in June 1975. At
that time, the Kennecott Copper Corporation was pitted against the environmentalists of the New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air & Water
(NMCCA&W) at an Environmental Protection Agency hearing in Silver
City. Years of debating federal and state air standards were at stake in
the emotion-filled meetings. The tension was so high that a local labor
leader tried to pick a fight with John BartHt, chair of the NMCCA&W. At
the heart of the debate was whether to keep a copper smelter open, and
how to insure clean air, two of the most salient economic features of
New Mexico-industry and tourism. 1
The first of these economic factors, the mining industry, had longstanding roots in New Mexico. Since the late nineteenth century, mining
flourished in Grant County. Initially, gold and silver dominated the
county's mineral output through 1900. By 191O,however, precious metals
gave way to copper production, a transition common to many mining
districts in the American West.
As early as 1800, the Spanish mined the red metal at Santa Rita, the
oldest copper mining camp in the continental United States. Yet Apache
military resistance through the 1850s, lack of efficient transportation
until the mid-1880s, and limited technology until the early 1900s delayed
the development of low grade copper deposits. A new era was inaugu-
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rated in 1906, however, when Daniel C. Jackling initiated open-pit mining
at Bingham, Utah. Soon thereafter, copper pits were started throughout
the West: the Ray pit in Arizona, the Ely in Nevada, and the Chino in
Grant County, New Mexico. 2
In 1932, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, with roots in Alaska and
financial backing from the Guggenheim family, bought the Chino mine.
Anticipating World War II demands, Kennecott built a smelter in 1939 at
Hurley, the milltown ofthe original mine owner, the Chino Copper Company. Production at the mine, the fifth largest copper pit in the world at
that time, jumped from 33 million pounds in 1938 to 152 million in 1942;
from the end of World War II to 1987, the mine averaged more than 140
million pounds a year, peaking at 244 million in 1987. Such output warranted employment of nearly 2,000 workers, although these numbers
gradually declined to about 1,300 with rising mechanization in the three
decades after the war. Simultaneously, the average expenditure per copper worker rose from about $5.50 an hour to nearly $20 during this period. Grant County's per capita income, for example, was the highest in
the state at $168 a week in 1973 (copper workers actually averaged $213),
with Bernalillo ranked second at $138. The copper operations, in essence, were a mainstay of the New Mexico economy by the 1950s, the
county's producers alone contributing more thilO a million dollars annually in taxes, a figure that rose to six million by the late 1980s. 3
The state allowed Kennecott's smelter to operate unregulated from
1939 through the 1960s. The company's tax revenues benefited both Grant
County and the state, and there were no complaints about the toxic
emissions. Regardless, workers and their families living in Hurley regularly experienced respiratory problems, especially in the cooler months
from September through March. Herb McGrath, who worked in the smelter
for thirty years (1953-1983), remembered in a 1993 interview that "there
was usually a very thick layer of smoke from Santa Rita to Hurley until
they began to correct it in the 1970s." Likewise, Larry Himes, who "grew
up in the shadow of the smokestack" in the 1940s and 1950s, recalled
that winters were the worst tim y for bad air. Paint jobs on automobiles
"went bad within two years. We accepted ... [these things) ... as part
of living in Hurley."4
By the mid-1960s the toxicity of New Mexico's air began to concern
citizens. State measurements revealed rising levels of sulfur oxides during the 1960s from a 250-'kiloton average to more than 500 kilotons. By
the mid-1970s, the figure peaked at about 975 kilotons. s These high levels of sulfuric gases in part corresponded to the rapidly risingpopulation of the Southwest (i.e., more automobile operators). But more
important were the increasing emissions of the copper smelters in the
industrial corridor from Douglas, Arizona, where Phelps Dodge had been
operating a smelter since 1914, to EI Paso, Texas, a lead-copper smelter
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center since the late-nineteenth century. When weather systems pushed
the "bad" air to the north, where it combined with smog from Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Albuquerque, and smoke from oil refineries of Texas
and coal-burning utility plants of the Four Corners area, one of the
nation's most treasured natural wonders, the Grand Canyon, was filled
with polluted air. Southwesterners literally visualized the "blurring" of
the open skies by the mid-1960s. 6
At first, retirees and other newcomers to the area complained about
the air pollution. But their complaints failed to move the copper industry
to clean up the smelter emissions. Larger forces would be needed to
confront the copper behemoth. The roots of the fight to clean up the
Southwest's air began with a biologist-writer, Rachel Carson. Her bestselling book, Silent Spring, launched environmentalism into a new phase.
Her graphic descriptions of the dangers of pesticides, especially of DDT,
and the real and potential human loss of the carcinogenic sprays dramatically elevated public awareness of the threats of atmospheric toxins. Carson's pleas moved President John F. Kennedy in 1963 to appoint
a special panel of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee to examine pesticide use. The committee agreed with Carson and criticized
the industry and the federal government for allowing unregulated pesticide use. Eventually, Carson's efforts resulted in the Pesticide Control
Act of 1972. 7
Silent Spring galvanized the environmental movement in the United
States and the rest of the western world. At the second quadrennial
meeting of the National Conference on Air Pollution in 1962, for example,
former U.S. surgeon general Dr. Luther L. Terry vociferously announced
that the destruction of the atmosphere was a crime. "Who is to blame?
Where are the culprits? ... Where?" he queried, knowing the answer.
"WE ARE ALL GUILTY-not health officials alone, nor legislators, nor
businessmen-but ALL of us!" The environment was at the mercy of
humans and "we cannot blame the vagaries of nature for its defects. The
time is past [for such thinking]. WE are responsible. Let's get on with it!
Let's clean the air!"8
As a result of such environmental concerns, Congress amended the
1955 Clean Air Act in 1963. But this act demonstrated the power of the
smokestack industries in the United States by reiterating that air pollution, although becoming a national problem, was still a local responsibility. In large part, the law reflected the traditional authority of industry,
and the still limited power of the nascent environmental movement. In
addition, industrialists understood that they had greater sway over state
legislatures than Congress, largely because ofthe monumental economic
benefits in jobs and taxes that industry produced. Consequently, indus-

CHRISTOPHERJ. HUGGARD

373

try-the Kennecotts and General Motors of America-won the first air
battle, despite evidence that industrial stacks annually spewed more
than 20 million tons of sulfur oxides into the atmosphere. 9
By 1967, however, the tide began to turn as new environmental groups
emerged and learned how to lobby effectively. National organizations,
such as the Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, the National Wildlife Federation, and the Sierra Club, led the fight for federal emission and
ambient air standards. Their power grew in lobbying, legal strength; and
in numbers as membership in these organizations skyrocketed to nearly
a million by the mid-1960s. lo
Federal regulation and enforcement would have to wait, however,
until 1970, despite support from President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had
hoped to bolster his Great Society program with a stricter Clean Air Act.
The chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senator Edmund Muskie, did not support federal emission standards at this
early date because he was unwilling to compromise his presidential hopes
by antagonizing corporate America. Thus, an industrial conglomerate,
headed by the American Mining Congress, the National Coal Association, and the American Petroleum Institute, staved off federal emissions
controls in favor of ambient air standards beginning in 1967. \I
Attempts to curb New Mexico's air pollution began with little fanfare in 1962. While the city of Albuquerque did create a city-county
board to address the growing automobile emissions problems that many
western cities faced in the postwar era, the state legislature did not pass
the Air Quality Control Act, the first of its kind, until 1967. Like the
federal air laws of 1967 and earlier, no specific regulations or standards
were established; the lack of scientific understanding, combined with
strong industrial lobbying, resulted in a watered-down bill. 12
Until 1970, air quality in New Mexico was under the jurisdiction of
the Department of Health and Social Services. Yet, its air quality division had no qualified experts as late as the end of 1968, and only four air
pollution monitors existed in the entire state; not a single state employee, in fact, knew how to interpret the monitors' readings, which
only detected and did not measure contamination. The Board of Health
also had limited air control in rural areas that requested state regulation;
municipalities and Class B counties, like Grant County, were selfregulated. As a result, Kennecott determined the "safe" quantities of sulfur
dioxide and particulate matter (dust-like particles of smoke) to be emit'
ted from its smelter. 13
The federal ambient air standards established by the 1967 Clean Air
Act amendment influenced New Mexico's similarly weak law. Instead of
curbing the amount of pollution emitted from the stacks, which required
new technology to capture the wastes for recycling, the ambient air
regulations only enforced measurement of the concentration of toxins
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such as sulfur dioxide (S02) in the area around the smelters. Weather
and terrain greatly affected the parts per million (ppm) of S02 and particulates dispersed in the atmosphere. Because this standard did not
measure the amount of material corning out of the stacks, but how it was
dispersed in the atmosphere, new technology was not necessary. If alterations in the smelters were needed, Intermittent Control Systems (ICS)
were available, at a far lower cost, which allowed near constant production (e.g., at the Hurley smelter), despite continued high levels of S02
and particulates.
Because of the ineffectiveness of the 1967 amendment, Congress
worked to formulate a scientific definition of pollutants and how to regulate them. That investigation culminated in the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution in 1970. Unlike previous
legislation, however, the resulting amendments took on far greater significance because Congress had created the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) on 1 January 1970, to define and enforce the new regulations. Furthermore, the environmental contingent-e.g., the Environmental Defense Fund and the Sierra Club-made a strong showing at the
hearings.
Despite the public and federal call to clean up the air, the mining
coalition reiterated its support for local control. In his statement to the
Senate committee, David Swan, vice-president of technology for
Kennecott and representative for the American Mining Congress (AMC),
introduced his opposition to federal regulations in the following manner:
The environmental effects of ... operations are carefully considered in the planning and engineering of every mining and
processing facility developed [in America] ... Industry, as a
part of the community, accepts the obligation to operate in a
socially responsible manner. Both through their own resources
and those of manufacturing suppliers, AMC members have been
at the forefront of the development of measures to protect environmental quality, including air quality, and of the technology
needed to do SO.14
In spite of this seemingly pro-environment pronouncement, Swan
next stated his opposition to federal emissions control in the "air regions" established under the provisions of the 1967 law. "There is no
reason," Swan argued, "to believe that the federal government is in a
better position than state and local air pollution control agencies to
promulgate emission standards or regulations.... Virtually every citizen-individual and institutional-is contributing to air pollution and
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other environmental degradation."'s The mining industry, therefore,
viewed air pollution as a problem for local agencies, government institutions that either did not exist or were in the planning stages.
The mining industry's attempts to curtail federal emissions standards in 1970 did not succeed, though, despite a hushed meeting between executives of the major copper corporations and White House
officials. The new air quality amendment, in fact, redirected national
resource policy. No longer did Congress allow unlimited production and
growth. Rather, the nation's legislators called for limitations on production, especially when air and other features of the environment were
threatened. The new law, in effect, redefined the role of the federal government, represented by EPA, and initiated guidelines for states to devise implementation plans to meet the new standards. Each of the "copper"
states-Arizona, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah-followed
the national example, establishing plans to meet the new standards and
creating new environmental agencies to address the pressing problem. 16
In the hope of protecting life and property, the 1970 amendments
established primary and secondary standards. The primary standards
protected "public health," whereas the secondary protected "public welfare." The former regulations defended against disease, while the latter
category protected vegetation, animals, property, soil, and, extremely
important for the scenic West, visibility. The law set the primary S02
standard at .03 ppm and the secondary at .02 ppm, and then EPA regulated compliance. The new agency gave the states until February 1972 to
submit implementation plans to meet the federal guidelines, and established the last day ofl974 for attainment of primary standards, and the
end of 1977 to meet secondary regulations. 17
In 1970, New Mexico's legislature created the Environmental Improvement Agency (EIA). During the next year and a half, the EIA set out to
write an implementation plan to meet the federal guidelines. At public
hearings, another state body, the Environmental Improvement Board
(EIB), played a decisive role in setting emissions standards and granting variances to the mining companies. But the EI.!3, consisting of five
governor-appointed members, often disappointed environmentalists
because the board tended to decide in favor of industry, jobs, and taxes. 18
To establish air quality standards, the state held several public hearings. The first important meeting occurred in Santa Fe in October 1971.
Here the interested parties-Kennecott, the state, and environmentalists-defined their positions for what became a heated debate. One of
the main issues was emissions at the Hurley smelter..
State air division official, Betty Perkins, initiated the debate. She
told how the smelter poured nearly 300 tons of sulfur into the air daily
and how there were no emissions controls at the Grant County plant.
Furthermore, although Kennecott knew of and had even implemented
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environmental technology to curb emissions in Arizona, the company
had not done so in New Mexico. Something had to be done, she argued,
to stop this abuse.
Kennecott's expert witness, Dr. Charles Hine of the University of
California School of Medicine, responded that the problem was not as
grave as Perkins suggested. The atmosphere safely processed sulfur
emissions, Hine claimed, because the earth and its living creatures produced two-thirds of the sulfur in the air. Moreover, he asserted, the
federal standards for S02 were far more stringent than needed. In fact,
he argued, irritation did not occur until levels reached 2 to 3 ppm and
that "most persons" could handle 8 to 12 ppm in the air. 19
The pro-industry forces, however, met strong opposition at the
meeting. Helen Gram, state president of the League of Women Voters, for
example, argued that the EIA needed to set standards that were stricter
than the federal regulations. After all, in an earlier statement the EIB
declared New Mexico a "clean air" state. The League, therefore, she
continued, urged "the board to adopt emission regulations that ... reflect the wishes of the citizens of this state and prevent further degradation of New Mexico's environment."2o
At the next day's hearing, a longtime Grant County resident, LaVerne
Herrington; voiced similar concerns. She complained of a regular cloud
of smoke that socked in the Arena Valley where she lived. The Hatchita
Mountains along the Mexican border, Herrington contended, were "rarely
seen now, rather than rarely obscured." Many of the valley's residents
viewed the bad air as "unpleasant smog," pollution they had escaped
when they moved there from cities such as Los Angeles and Phoenix. 21
On the third day of the hearings, "witnesses mixed the fine points of
science with the rough edges of personal emotion."22 Most of the sparring pitted Kennecott lawyer William Dempsey of Washington, D.C.,
against Mike Williams, research coordinator for the John Muir Institute
for Environmental Studies. Whereas Dempsey reiterated the company's
argument that S02 emissions at Hurley were safe for workers and the
plant life nearby, Williams attacked these assumptions. His calculations
showed that as much as 650 tons of S02 poured daily out ofthe smokestacks. At these levels of discharge, he said, the smelter was "spewing
more of the chemical into New Mexico skies than Houston, Texas,
Marietta, Ohio, or Los Angeles, California." Furthermore, this measure
of toxins was 60 percent of the daily emissions of New York City and "it
should be obs,erved that sulfur dioxide is
responsible-along with
in New York in Novemparticulate matter-for the 168 excess deaths
ber ofl966. "23
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Kennecott even had to endure a tirade from one of its own stockholders, Valerie Kockelman of Santa Fe. She "delivered a vitriolic tongue
lashing against Kennecott officials-who at first laughed at the presentation but grew more silent as the personal indictment became more severe":
Kennecott does an awful lot of air polluting-besides the kind
you do in your executive suites [in] New York City.... Kennecott
owns, as a subsidiary, the Peabody Coal Co., which is engaged
in coal mining operations on the Navajo Reservation at Black
Mesa. That says a whole lot about you ... Let the stockholders
pay, and pay through the nose [for environmental technology],
for their past unearned profits. Let them pay for your company's
shortsightedness and for your company's mismanagement, and
for your firm's lack of social conscience. 24
By going on the record and donating her dividends to conservation
organizations, she hoped to alleviate her "distressing and embarrasing
position" as a stockholder of the offending company.2S Kockelman's
belated environmental awareness was typical of what many Americans
were going through who had long benefitted from the unchecked exploitation ofthe environment.
In the end, however, the mining industry made a most compelling
argument. Its activities, it pointed out, although detrimental to the environment, were a large part of why Americans lived in such an affluent
way. The exploitation of the environment benefitted everyone, as
Kockelman's own confession suggested. Why at this late date, Chino's
general manager Richard Leveille asked, did their company have to take
the brunt of the costs of clean-up? This economic factor weighed heavily
in the EIB's decision to set lenient regulations.
As of January 1972, Jhe standard for S02 emissions for currently
operating nonferrous smelters was 60 percent control; plants constructed
after this date had to reach 90 percent control. In other words, for every
100 tons of sulfur dioxide produced at smelters already in operation, 60
tons had to be removed from stack emissions. These weak standards
were a victory for the mining industry. And environmentalists were left
blaming the EIB for giving in to the old fears "of economic disaster,
unemployment, and curtailment of planned expansion. "26
Environmentalists were successful, however, in Arizona, Montana,
Utah, Nevada, and Washington. In each of these states, Kennecott,
Phelps Dodge, and Anaconda painfully witnessed the passage of new
air quality standards at 90 percent removal of S02' The costs to comply
were staggering. Through 1971, Kennecott alone committed more than
$130 million, or upwards of 30 percent of the value of all its western
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smelter plants and equipment, to the clean-up. The company spent $67.5
million at its Utah Division, the largest amount of any single operation,
and $23.2 million at Chino. Kennecott fought back, filing lawsuits in
Arizona and Nevada, arguing that the standards were too strict. Anaconda did the same in.Montana. In the end, the states' regulations were
more stringent than the federal controls set in 1970. To counter this apparent betrayal (and contrary to traditional support of the mining industry in the Rocky Mountain states), Kennecott and other copper
corporations called for federal measures to negate the now more strict
state regulations. 27
New Mexico, notwithstanding, the environmental movement had
made its mark in the air pollution conflict of the Southwest. But environmentalists in New Mexico were not willing to give up, and leading the
way was the New Mexico Citizens for Clean Air & Water.
The NMCCA&W was the inspiration of Nancy Bartlit. She, along
with her husband John, who took a job as a chemical engineer at Los
Alamos National Laboratory, moved to New Mexico in the early 1960s to
live in the "splendor" of the American West. The Bartlits epitomized
western environmentalists, who in general were newcomers, well educated, and concerned for the well-being of their families and the environment surrounding them. Hoping to raise their two children in the
sparkling clear air of the Southwest, they became increasingly concerned
with the heavy plume of smoke that regularly drifted into their area from
the Four Corners utility plant. Nancy could only reminisce about the
magnificent and untainted vistas of the Sangre de Cristo Mountains
seen from their kitchen and living room windows. One occasion, in particular, etched the air pollution problem in the Bartlits' minds when friends
from the Northeast were visiting. Instead of a clear panorama of the
rugged and colorful peaks, they could hardly see beyond their valley,
and nearby Bandelier National Monument was shrouded in a hazy mist,
the kind of smog their guests were hoping to escape. "If you don't see
the mountains in the West," Nancy later lamented, "what is there. "28
Nancy regularly discussed declining visibility at local meetings of
the League of Women Voters. Her desire to begin a grassroots environmental group, however, originated with a local gadfly, Joe Devaney, who
in speaking before the League "identified and publicized" the air problem and then "damned" the Arizona Public Service for the pollution its
utility plant spewed into the southwestern skies. Consequently, Nancy
convinced her husband John, Mike Williams, and others in 1969 to
co-found the NMCCA&W.
Rooted in opposition to the utility plant emissions and a proposed
paper mill in Albuquerque, the NMCCA&W soon took up the fight for
clean air throughout the state. John became the chair and spokesperson
for the group in 1971, while Nancy served as "troubleshooter" and
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"behind-the-scenes organizer," planning the "mission" from an office
in their home. Mike Williams took on the role of the "scientific genius,"
and Grove Burnett, trained in environmental law, served as the
organization's attorney. John brought national recognition to the
NMCCA&W in 1972, when he testified before the Senate Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution during hearings concerning state implementation of federal standards. 29
As chair, John BartIitcombined the aesthetic environmentalism of
his wife with a 'scientific or technocratic version of his own. Although
disconcerted with air pollution and its potential risks to human health,
visibility, and plant and animal life, he had a strong faith in technology.
"Citizens needed to bring technology to the forefront," he argued, "to
change the debate. That's how I .came .to bean environmentalist." As a
technocratic environmentalist his biggest complaint was that the utility
and mining companies had not implemented the most efficient environmental equipment available on the national and even international markets. His hope was to pressure Kennecott to install the best technology
to meet 90 percent control of S02 and 99.7 percent clean-up of particulate matter. These standards could be met, he argued, because the con.verters, scrubbers, and modern furnaces were already in use in Japan,
Canada, and Finland. Borrowing from traditional industrial rhetoric, Bartlit
also argued that implementation of new technology created jobs in the
manufacture and operation of the equipment. In a strong break from
radical environmentalists, who called for eradication of the smokestack
industries, Bartlit argued that the installation of air control systems would
clean up the air and benefit the economy. Essentially, the NMCCA&W's
chairman called for the best facets of both worlds, an ideology that went
a long way in bridging the interests of mining companies.and the environmentalists. 30
Through the 1970s, NMCCA&W played an extremely important role
in keeping air quality issues before governmental agencies, the mining
companies, and the general public. Bartlit, Williams, .and Burnett skillfully cross-examined the industry's expert witnesses at hearings to prove,
for example, that the technology was available to change emissions lev. els at Hurley. Initially designed to discredit and fluster witnesses, especially nonprofessional and untrained environmentalists, the right to
cross-examine participants at public hearings was put into state1aw at
the insistence of industrialists. Bartlit, however, turned the stratagem
on the mining industry and himself cross-examined corporate experts to
reveal deception and contradictions in their statements from
time-to-time just as the corporate henchmen had done with the unwitting citizen on occasion.
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In 1975, the air debate reached a climax in New Mexico. By this time,
the environmentalists were at full strength and the mining companies
were fighting for their economic lives because of the recession, the energy crisis, growing operational costs, and rising global competition. In
addition, the EPA and Congress were reassessing the Clean Air Act,
amendments, beginning in 1975, to devise standards capable of ensuring
cleaner air that were not too costly to industry. As a result, the EPA
hearing at Silver City, from 19-21 June 1975, took on added importance
for the interested parties. At stake was the survival of one of New
Mexico's most lucrative, longstanding industries, as well as clean air
and visibility.
The tension was high as the participants gathered for the meeting.
Everybody of any importance in Grant County was there: state representatives Murray Ryan (Republican) and Thomas Foy (Democrat), Chino
manager Richard Leveille and his assistants, Juan Chac6n, and Chano
Merino of the United Steel Workers (USW), and any number of concerned citizens both for and against stricter air standards; most Grant
County residents, however, supported relaxation of the regulations (65
percent according to one poll).31
The scene had been set in the months before the summer meeting.
Clearly, the state and its highest officials sympathized with the mining
industry. In 1974, for example, the EIB awarded Kennecott a variance,
extending the deadline to comply with the 90 percent particulate standard (the 60 percent S02 standard was still enforced) as late as 1979.
When the state Council on Environmental Quality recommended tougher
air standards to Governor Bruce King in early 1974, he opposed the measure and announced: "Many of my advisors feel the proposal [for stricter
standards] would be unduly restrictive. I like to see a balanced approach
which doesn't degrade the environment or hamper the economy to provide jobs for people raised in New Mexico."32 Only three months before
the EPA hearing, the state legislature killed an environmental quality
act, despite support from King's successor, Governor Jerry Apodaca.
Frustrated with the bill's defeat, Sally Rodgers, lobbyist for the Central
Clearing House, a confederation of environmental groups, blamed "raw
political pressure by the large industrial lobbyists" and irrational fear of
the bill by some "legislators who believed the horror stories" of the total
collapse ofthe state's mining industry.33
The EPA and the NMCCA&W confronted a "hostile audience" at
the 19 June hearing. More than a hundred people showed up to taunt the
environmentalists, called "petty despots and their little friends" by Grant
County Chamber of Commerce manager Jim Elliott. John Bartlit opened
the meeting reiterating the NMCCA&W's stance for higher standards.
Amid booing and jeering in front of a pro-company crowd, Bartlit announced that:
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[the) reputation of Kennecott is one of bad faith and foot dragging in their actions toward pollution control. Sixty percent sulfur oxides is enough to meet state and federal regulations, but
greater control is necessary [to keep New Mexico~s air clean) ...
we again recommend 90 per cent [for S02) today. Our position
has not changed. 34
But, unlike the earlier hearing in Santa Fe, the pro-company forces
collectively protested the economic hardships they attributed to environmental regulations. For Grant County residents, the EPA and the environmentalists were outsiders threatening their tax revenues and their
jobs. Jim Elliott, in fact, protested the loudest. He warned the EPA officials of how "unbridled power to a team of anti-industry enthusiasts ..
. would shut ... down" an industry, even after it had spent hundreds of
millions of dollars on new environmental technology. The Chamber of
Commerce manager then asked,
[Do] anti-business [and) anti-industry people have other jobs
lined up for those workers in some Utopia where the air is pure
and the streams are brimming with clear water the year 'round
and where it's against the law for the sun to hide its face. Who
will foot the bill? Who picks up the tab for unemployment, for
investment losses in both industry and commerce, and for straggling migration ofa trained labor force to the food stamp lines
and dole offices in already over-crowded cities?H
Leveille and other Chino officials could not have been more pleased
with this display of support. Elliott was echoing the sentiments that
Kennecott espoused in its testimony before the Senate Subcommitte on
Air and Water Pollution.
Other witnesses testified in favor of the copper corporation. Ruth
Graham, a rancher in the Mimbres River Valley, northeast of the smelter,
testified that during fifteen years ofresidence in the area air pollution
was not a problem. "I moved here from Los Angeles County, [California)," she proudly attested, "and my eyes haven't burned and I haven't
coughed, and I know it is because of the good clean air." On the other
hand, Local 890 representative Chano Merino was less concerned with
air pollution and more interested in securing jobs for members in the
USW union:
We don't need a lot of outsiders coming in and telling us what
to do, but we are concerned about jobs. We are not in love with
Kennecott, but we negotiate· in good faith. When somebody
says Kennecott is not of good faith I resent it. It isn't the [smelter)
smoke that bothers us, it's when we don't see the smoke that it
bothers US. 36
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Ironically, the corporation and its workers, only a generation earlier at
odds, were now allied against the environmentalists who, they believed,
threatened profits and jobs.
Among the arch enemies of the company and the union was Sierra
Club representative Brant Calkin, who testified in favor of stricter standards. Yet, contrary to local gossip, he promised that his group hadno
intentions of forcing a shutdown at the smelter. Instead he recommended
to EPA officials that Kennecott produce the "economic data, put it into
the record, and ... take a look at it" before making the final decision
about air quality measures. A seemingly innocuous statement, this remark was an indictment of Kennecott's claims of closing down; threats
that one pro-environment state legislator called "economic blackmail,"
despite promises to Governor Apodaca and U.S. Senator Pete Domenici
to the contrary.37 .
The June hearing in Grant County set the stage for the national
showdown'over the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Among the
major players in the debate was Senator Domenici of New Mexico. The
traditional importance of the copper industry was not lost on the powerful Republican, who served on the oversight hearings in 1974, the implementation hearings in 1975, and the amendment hearings in 1977. He also
directed the "Copper Caucus," a Washington, D.C.-based lobbyingcoalition designed to bailout the ailing industry during the 1970s. In these
capacities, he wanted to provide relief for Kennecott and the other major
copper corporations.
Although nominally in favor of clean air, Domenici unde.rstood the
hardships the industry was facing during the recession of the mid-1970s.
Moreover, the energy crisis was overshadowing environmentalism. Congress, therefore, decided to reintroduce the air debate. As a result, industrialists and environmentalists alike initiated the greatest flood of
lobbying since the Taft-Hartley Act; the environmental movement era
undoubtedly ranked with the rise of unionism as one of the strongest
threats to corporate hegemony in American industry in the twentieth
century.
At the Senate hearings, mining representatives complained of the
high costs to comply with governmental standards. The expenditures
for environmental technology, Kennecott's President Frank Milliken testified, increased costs by five to six percent, placing American produc. ers at a disadvantage in the world market. Peruvian, Zambian, Zairean,
and Chilean companies, which produced higher grade copper at lower
costs, did not have to answer to an environmental bureaucracy whose
rules cut deep into corporate profits. 38
To air the mining industry's financial concerns Domenici and Senator Gary Hart of Colorado, elicited information from Kennecott's officials about the temporary alternatives for controlling smelter emissions.
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Although present for the Sierra Club's arguments in favor of immediate
implementation of abatement controls, Domenici showed more interest
in the testimony of David Swan, vice':"'president of technology for.
Kennecott, who called for continued use of Supplementary Control Systems (SCS, equivalent to the Intermittent Control Systems). Swan argued that the technological costs-an estimated $245 million more than
already spent-were not commensurate with the environmental benefits.
Abatement controls were too expensive to install at older plants such as
the Hurley smelter. To give the industry time to plan for the transition to
these measures, Swan contended, the SCS must be allowed or production would plummet. Furthermore, he declared, energy consumption would
increase dramatically. And during the energy crisis, the estimated 22
million gallons of additional fuel oil needed to operate abatement controls could not be justified. These arguments hit a high note for the
senators concerned with national Cold War strategy during the
mid-1970s. 39
Laurence I. Moss, president of the Sierra Club, countered industry's
complaints about costs with a plea for human safety':
What the argument really comes down to [Moss stated] is whether
we should give
industries the option of saving money by not
putti.ng in the
equipment that theycould put in, and polluting the air and jeopardizing the public health and welfare in the
process. I don't believe that we should give them that option. 40
But more than implementing the technology available, Moss was concerned with "the question of prevention of significant deterioration" of
the atmosphere in "clean air" regions, especially in the American West.
Continued use of towering smokestacks and intermittent systems was
not enough, he continued, because these techniques still "spread pollution over thousands of square miles, impairing visibility and increasing
the acidity of the rainwater. "41
The environmental opposition made clear where they stood. The
environmentalists-:'-who garnered support from numerous governmental and private organizations; among them the League of Women Voters,
the American Lung Association, and the Natural Resource Defense Council-wanted the best technology installed in western smelters. They also
called for a Ii mit to the number of new smokestacks in the region to
protect visibility in national forests, national parks, and national monuments. For them, protection of the air in the West was preservation of
one of America's most.cherished natural resources. Just as old growth
forests, spotted owls, and scenic rivers of the public domain were protected, so too should clean air be coveted and preserved for future gen-
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erations. With the Clean Air Act, the federal government categorized the
nation's atmosphere among one of its principal environmental treasures,
and the environmentalists meant to keep it that way.·2
The industrial coalition fought back by proposing specific
antienvironment amendments to the Clean Air Act in the mid-1970s. First,
the coalition recommended that Congress limit emission controls to primary ambient air standards only, and that intermittent pollution control
systems be allowed in favor of abatement measures. Second, they requested a five-year delay for compliance (to 1982) with the 90 percent
clean-up measures. Third, the industrialists audaciously called for elimination of state implementation plans and termination of the current system for establishing emissions standards. In its place, they argued for
controls based on "available technology" and not on "arbitrary" health
standards. Finally, they lobbied to eliminate the no significant deterioration criteria altogether. 43
Such reasoning convinced Senator Domenici In 1976 to introduce
legislation to alleviate the copper industry's economic woes. As part of
the 1977 amendments, therefore, Domenici proposed allowing use of the
SCS at least until 1982. The senate committee then passed the amendment by a seven to six vote. The continued "use of these controls," New
Mexico's senator argued, was "essential to the copper industry's future .
. . , [and although the measure will not give] the industry as much flexibility as it needs, [it] will at least give them an alternative to having to
close many older plants entirely."44
The New Mexico senator still understood the importance of visibility and clean air in New Mexico. Because of the extraordinary natural
wonders, combined with the presence of viable smokestack industries
such as copper smelting and electricity generation, the state played a
"featured role" in the air debate. This dichotomous and unique characteristic of New Mexico and the rest of the Southwest did not escape
Domenici's attention. Consequently he introduced a "new clean air package" to the 1977 amendments (along with proposals to extend emission's
compliance) to protect national forests, monuments, and wilderness areas from excessive air pollution. Known as the "no-degradation" bill,
this legislation created new clean airsheds designed to encapsulate New
Mexico's coveted natural spots-the Gila National Forest and Wilderness Area, Bandelier, Bosque del Apache, Carlsbad Caverns, and other
national resorts in the state and throughout the West. The new measure,
for example, restricted growth of new industries near the designated
airsheds, while also requiring already operating plants to curtail emissions when weather systems threatened to push bad air into the protected areas. 4S
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In August 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the newest
version of the Clean Air Act. In it, Domenici's provisions for protecting
the airsheds appeared as did his pro-industry amendment. For Kennecott
and its Hurley smelter, the Non-ferrous Smelter Order (NSO) of the act
was most important. The NSO generously gave the copper industry five
more years to meet the mandatory 90 percent sulfur dioxide arid particulate matter controls. Likewise, the act required the states to declare air
regions as either attainment or non-attainment areas. The New Mexico
Environmental Improvement Division was given until 1 January 1979, to
classify air regions in one of the categories. 46
In 1982, Kennecott finally met the 90 percent standards. To do so,
the Hurley smelter was revamped with a new acid plant and a flash furnace. These changes, however, did not completely eliminate the air pollution problem of New Mexico. Although the state and federal standards
are in place to control high levels of toxicity, abuses still exist. The
Hurley smelter, for example, on occasion emits measures of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter above the standards; as a result, the furnaces
are sometimes shut down, largely because of weather systems that sock
in the toxic atmospheric wastes. On a larger scale, as a recent American
Lung Association· (ALA) report revealed, the Southwest's industrial
smokes daily place millions of Americans at risk. The industrial corridor
from EI Paso to Phoenix, in particular, blurs the open skies of the borderlands region. In addition, major western cities pollute the western skies
at unacceptable levels largely because of automobile emissions. Los
Angeles' and Denver's air is especially toxic. Throughout the United
States, the ALA predicts, 23 million people are subject to "dangerous"
levels of noxious gases. 47
Despite this gloomy picture, the efforts of environmentalists have
made a dramatic difference in the quality of the Southwest's skies~ In
1991, John Bartlit experienced a pleasant encounter with Hurley's smelter
manager at a state environmental regulation meeting. To the
environmentalist's surprise, the young mining official had· never seen a
smelter without some measure of sulfur controls, and he had been in the
business since 1975. Bartlit immediately reflected on this fact, thinking
back to the hearings in Silver City, where he was booed for his call to
clean up the ai r. He also reminisced of the decade-and-a-half of hard
work and dedication to convince the state and the mining companies
that 90 percent or higher air pollution control was both economically
and socially better for the people of New MexiCo. And even though
Kennecott was a casualty of the air war, having sold out to Mitsubishi
ofJapan and Phelps Dodge by 1986, a rejuvenated smelter now stood as
tribute to his technocratic ~nvironmentalism,which Bartlit claimed was
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pro-environment and pro-industry. The philosophy created jobs and
cleaned up the air. As the cofounder of the NMCCA&W recently stated,
"I am for industry. And I am for clean air."48
The clean air fight in New Mexico was indicative of a regional and
even national movement to limit the toxins that Americans breathed on
an everyday basis. Just as the New Mexico Environmental Improvement
Board, the NMCCA&W, and the United States Environmental Protection
Agency jousted and jostled in the debate the battle raged in Arizona,
Montana, and Nevada in the West and in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New
York in the East. Congress led a national environmental movement with
passage of the Clean Air Act amendments in 1967,1970, and 1977 (and
later in 1990). As a result, state governments implemented and enforced
plans to reduce automobile and industrial emissions in America. In large
measure, these events reflected grassroots efforts-such as Rachel
Carson's pleas in Silent Spring and the activities of the NMCCA&Wto initiate the environmental movement. Now, nature-its terrain and the
living creatures-had a voice. The atmosphere, air, had become.a national treasure. Regulatory agencies at the federal and state level were
in place to safeguard the new item on America's endangerment list.
For the mining industry, the air battle was a hard lesson learned. By
1990, more than $3.5 billion had been spent on environmental controls
during the preceding two decades..There were casualties as well. The
copper corporations closed down smelters in Montana, Arizona, and
Nevada. Ironically, Mitsubishi constructed a 250-million ton copper
smelter with the required environmental technology on the Houston ship
canal at Texas City, Texas, in the early 1990s. Likewise, two of the nation's,
the world's, largest copper producers, Anaconda Copper and Kennecott
Copper corporations, vanished into thin air by 1986-in fact, they no
longer existed. And, even though they chose sale of their property over
bankruptcy, they might have been forced into the latter choice if they
had stayed in the business. If these corporate giants, which went nearly
unregulated before the late 1960s, had listened to the winds of change in
that decade and acted on those hints immediately by installing environmental technology, they might still be here today running cleaner and
profitable mining ventures in the American West.
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